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1 INTRODUCnON 
It is often stressed that unemployment insurance may lead to less employment and output 
and, consequently, creates efficiency losses (see for example, Danziger et al, 1981, 
Björklund and Holmlund, 1991 and Layard et al, 1991). In Vijlbrief (1992), we focus on 
the discouraging effect of benefits and taxation on labour supply and demand, although 
other decisions, like those to save and invest, may also be influenced by unemployment in-
surance, or more in general, by social security1. The first question we want to answer in 
this paper is why an institution that causes efficiency losses, social security, is so wide-
spread in developed economies. The most frequently heard explanation for the existence of 
social security is the combination of risk, aversion to risk, and failures of private insurance 
markets to cover this risk. A second reason for the existence of social security may be that 
people like a certain amount of income redistribution, either because of utility interdepen-
dence or because they just prefer equality to inequality. Since income redistribution is a 
public good, state intervention is needed to supply the optimum amount. Two additional 
arguments for social security are the administrative efficiency of the system (social security 
covers multiple risks at the same time) and paternalism (left to themselves, people may 
have a tendency to underinsure). Section 2 surveys the reasons for the existence of social 
security more extensively. Hence, this section also indicates why the adverse effects of 
unemployment insurance on efficiency do not necessarily imply that the optimal unemploy-
ment benefit level is smaller than the current level. 
Although there are motives for state intervention, social security can only be a 
second-best solution, since it involves efficiency losses. A trade-off occurs between the most 
important advantages of higher unemployment benefits, more equality and more risk 
reduction, and the disadvantages, efficiency costs, for example measured by the loss in 
output (see Okun, 1975). Section 3 discusses some literature on this trade-off in social 
security, with special attention to the optimal unemployment insurance models by Baily 
(1978) and Flemming (1978). The balance between equity (equality and risk reduction) and 
efficiency in unemployment insurance is further elaborated in Section 4, by means of the 
'output possibilities curve' (see Breit, 1974). Firstly, this curve, that gives feasible combina-
tions of output and equity, is confronted with indifference curves that reflect typical 
opinions on social security. Secondly, the framework is used to identify the determinants of 
optimum benefit levels, like preferences regarding equality and efficiency, the degree of 
See for a survey of this topic, Danziger et al, 1981. Unemployment insurance may 
also have an efficiency-increasing effect by improving job-matches (see Albrecht and Axell, 
1984). 
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risk aversion and conjectures about the functioning of the labour market. 
The final part of section 4 is devoted to the construction of empirical output 
possibilities curves for the Netherlands, by means of a macroeconomic disequilibrium and 
equilibrium model (see Vijlbrief, 1992). These curves give an indication of the output 
losses, caused by unemployment insurance. Moreover, we examine whether this framework 
can give rationales for the popularity of the opinion (reflected by discussions about the 
misuse of benefits and the introduction of a 'mini-system') that the current Dutch 
unemployment benefit level is too high. This section closes with some calculations on the 
effects of replacing current Dutch unemployment insurance by a mini-system. Section 5 
contains a summary of this paper and some concluding comments. 
2 REASONS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
The social security system redistributes a considerable share of primary income in 
developed economies. This section focuses on the question why such redistnbution is 
desired by economie subjects, and why state intervention is required. Turning to the 
question why people wish to redistribute a part of their income, a number of explanations 
are available. The first approach, based on an article by Hochman and Rodgers (1969), 
assumes interdependence between the welfare of individuals. The utiiity of one person is 
positively related to either the consumption or the utiiity of another person. This opens up 
the possibility of Pareto-improving transfers. Using an example by Douben (1986, pp. 22-
24), we assume the following utiiity functions, in which the utiiity and consumption of A 
and B are given by Ua and Ca and Ub and Cb: 
u* -Ac.,q,) (!) 
u
h
 - / ( q ) (2) 
The utiiity interdependence is reflected by the presence of Cb in the utiiity function of A. 
Voluntary transfers from A to B will take place, if: 
ai/«
 > du^_ (3) 
aq, acm 
For both subjects the marginal utiiity of consumption by person B must be larger than the 
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marginal utility of consumption by A . In that case, income will be redistributed until 
person A's marginal utility of its own consumption equals the marginal utility of consump-
tion by B and Pareto optimum is achieved: 
EL~?EL (5) 
aq, aq 
A second way of explaining the voluntary redistribution of income is by pointing 
out the direct effect on an individual's utility of charity: in this case, the utility gain is not 
caused by the increase of income or utility of another person, but simply by the positive 
effect of a gift on a person's own utility (see Thurow, 1971, p. 328). Thurow gives yet 
another reason for the redistribution of income (1971, p. 327). He claims that a measure 
of the equality of the income distribution may enter the utility functions of individuals 
directly. Either since a person prefers more or less equality (just as he or she has a certain 
preference for any other good), or since there are externalities associated with the redis-
tribution of income, like the prevention of crime or social stability. 
According to these explanations for redistribution, the transfer of income is 
voluntary, so they cannot be used to explain state redistribution through social security. 
Why is state intervention required to achieve the preferred income redistribution? A 
reason for this is the public good character of income redistribution in large societies: 
although everyone prefers a certain amount of redistribution, an individual's willingness to 
contribute for it depends on the assurance that everyone else also contributes (see for 
example Hochman and Rodgers, 1969 and Arrow, 1981). Quoting Thurow (1971, p. 329): 
"Each individual has a vested interest in disguising nis preferences concerning bis 
desired income distribution to avoid paying bis optima! share of the necessary 
transfer payments." 
As it is the case with other public goods, the market will not be able to provide the 
Pareto-optimal amount of redistribution. Thurow (1971) and Orr (1976) developed models 
in which the public good character of income redistribution is stressed. The first author 
Note that this is automatically the case for person B, since Ca is absent in his utility 
function, so that Sübl <5Ca is zero. 
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approaches the search for an optimum income distribution as die classical problem of 
supplying the optimum quantity of a public good. In the optimum, there is unanimous 
agreement upon die public transfer policy and there are various tax rates, dependent on 
preferences for redistribution. In the model by Orr, the amount of transfers is determined 
by simple majority rule and, hence, by the median voter. This implies that most people 
prefer an amount of transfers that differs from the actual level in the equilibrium situation. 
The marginal revenue and cost of a certain level of income redistribution (refiected by the 
level of the social benefit) for the median voter are shown in Figure 1. The marginal 
revenue for the taxpayer of an increase in benefits falls when the benefit level rises, as the 
taxpayer's marginal utility of the recipient's income level is decreasing. The marginal cost 
of an increase in benefits (and taxes) rises with the benefit level, since the taxpayer's 
marginal utility of own income is also decreasing. The equilibrium level of benefits, B , is 
set to equate marginal revenue and cost of a rise in benefits for the median voter. 
Figure 1: Marginal revenue and cost of income redistribution for the median taxpayer 
Source: Douben, 1986, p. 30. 
An interesting point of Orr's model is that it also gives determinants of the 
amount of income redistribution in societies: the income level of the taxpayers (due to the 
falling marginal utility of income, the marginal cost of redistribution falls when income 
rises, resulting in higher transfers), the ratio of the number of benefit recipients and 
taxpayers (a fall in this ratio reduces the marginal cost of redistribution, leading to higher 
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transfers) and the number of benefit recipients (holding the ratio of benefit recipients and 
taxpayers constant, an increase in the number of recipients leads to a rise in the marginal 
revenue curve, raising the level of transfers). The relative weight of the income of benefit 
recipients in the utility functions of the taxpayers also influences the transfer level (more 
altruistic preferences by the taxpayer increase the marginal revenue of redistribution, 
leading to higher transfers). Empirical estimates by Orr of the determinants of the benefit 
level in the AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) program in the United 
States between 1963 and 1972 are consistent with the theoretical expectations. 
Another rationale for social security, which has nothing to do with altruistic 
preferences, is the 'insurance motive': people are willing to help persons in distress, since 
there is a chance that they will find themselves in such a position in the future. If individ-
uals are maximizers of expected utility and risk-averters, they will prefer insurance with a 
premium m to facing, without insurance, a probability distribution of expenditures with a 
mean of m (see Arrow, 1963, pp. 959-960 and Pauly, 1968, pp. 531-532). As long as the 
social gain of the pooling of risks by the insurance exceeds the transaction costs, there is a 
net social profit. However, to explain social security by the insurance motive, we have to 
point out why private insurance is not able to provide the required income protection. 
Several points, related to the failure of private insurance markets, are made in this respect. 
First, it can be asserted that social security takes care of uncertainties, rather than 
risks. Private insurance may not be applicable to uncertainties, like economie recessions, 
war and epidemics, since these uncertainties are undiversifiable (see Creedy and Disney, 
1985, p. 15). According to Atkinson (1987, p. 795), solidarity {social security) is required in 
such a case. This justification for social insurance is related to the 'contractarian theories' 
of social security and income redistribution by Harsanyi (1953 and 1955) and Rawls (1971). 
These authors claim that one's preference for a certain degree of redistribution should be 
govemed by one's ethical preferences (Harsanyi) or by the veil of ignorance (Rawls), both 
terms indicating a situation in which nobody knows what bis or her social position would 
be. In this situation, also called the 'original position', Rawls claims that people would opt 
for equality (see Rawls, 1971, p. 511). However, Okun (1975, p. 93) makes clear that this is 
only true when people are absolutely risk averse: 
" (people prefer) a society that guaranteed every family $14,000 a year -no more 
and no less- over one that provided 99 percent of all families with $20,000 and 1 
percent with $13,000. Put the American people in an 'original position' and I 
certainly would not expect them to act that way." 
Hence, social security may be regarded as the equalizing mechanism, chosen by a society 
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which only displays some degree of risk aversion. 
In the second place, private insurance may be impossible because of 'adverse 
selection' problems. These problems are caused by individuals, having different 'accident 
probabilities' and insurance companies, not having information on these various risks. 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show that in this case a 'pooling equilibrium', in which both 
low and high risk individuals buy the same insurance contract, is unstable, since there are 
proütable insurance altematives for the low risk individuals. Since an equilibrium with 
separate contracts for low and high risk individuals may also be unstable (see Rothschild 
and Stiglitz, 1976, pp. 636-637), it is very well possible that a private insurance market 
cannot function in the presence of adverse selection. In practice the adverse selection 
problem would lead to only attracting high-risk individuals and making private insurance 
unprofitable. It can be shown that social insurance, from which low-risk persons cannot opt 
out, may be Pareto-improving, compared to private insurance in the case of adverse 
selection (see Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976, Mortensen, 1983 and Jones, 1986). However, 
Spence (1978) argues that social insurance tends to 'solve' the adverse selection problem 
by reducing the optimum menu of insurance policies to a very small number of options 
(probably only one). This 'solution' could be inferior to the unregulated private insurance 
market, since consumer choices are severely restricted. 
A third problem of private insurance markets may be that private insurance 
companies have large problems with 'moral hazard'. In general, moral hazard is concerned 
with the effects of insurance on incentives. Pauly (1968) shows that moral hazard is in fact 
caused by a prisoner's dilemma: the individual faces a reduced price of the insured 
commodity (for example medical care or unemployment) and reacts by consuming more of 
it; as this strategy dominates for every individual, insurance premiums will have to rise. 
Some people will prefer no insurance to the high premiums and private insurance may 
become unprofitable. Even social insurance may not be optimal in this situation, since this 
implies that people are forced into insurance. The moral hazard problem could be reduced 
by using 'deductibles' or 'coinsurance', the former being the exclusion of a certain amount 
of expense from coverage, the latter requiring the individual to pay a fraction of the cost. 
Moral hazard problems can also be reduced by careful examination by the insurer of, for 
example, the necessity of medical treatment or the reason for becoming unemployed. In 
practice, this kind of monitoring is common in the case of unemployment insurance 
(remember the eligibility conditions for unemployment benefits in most European 
countries, see OECD, 1991, for a survey). Moreover, Arrow (1968, p. 538) remarks that 
although economie incentives may not lead to an optimal situation because of moral 
hazard, society may develop other instruments, like relations of trust and confidence, to 
prevent people from cheating. 
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Two other motives for social instead of private insurance may be mentioned. First, 
social insurance may be more efficiënt in the presence of fixed costs of administration, 
since it covers multiple contingencies at the same time. Second, it is sometimes asserted 
that, because of insufficiënt information, people may underinsure themselves. On these 
patemalist grounds, state intervention in insurance can be defended. 
Summarizing this section, the existence of social security may be explained by the 
public good character of income redistribution, by the failures of private insurance 
markets, by the administrative efficiency of the system and by paternalism. However, social 
security is only a second-best solution to these problems, since it involVes efficiency costs, 
caused by reduced incentives. This gives rise to a question of optimality, or otherwise 
stated, to a trade-off between equality and risk reduction on the one hand and efficiency 
on the other. Sections 3 and 4 deal with this subject. 
3 OPTIMAL SOCIAL SECURITY: THE CASE OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
The trade-off in social security, between income redistribution and risk reduction on the 
one hand and efficiency on the other, is illustrated by the extensive literature on optimal 
unemployment insurance. Several authors (Boadway and Oswald, 1983, Mortensen, 1983 
and Shavell, 1979) have shown that in the absence of moral hazard or with perfect 
monitoring or experience rating, full insurance is optimal3. However, when moral hazard 
exists and behaviour cannot be perfectly monitored and fully experience-rated unemploy-
ment insurance is impossible or costly, partial coverage (coinsurance) becomes the second-
best solution. In that case, the question what the unemployment insurance benefit should 
be, depends on conjectures about the efficiency loss, caused by reduced incentives to 
supply labour, and on the value one attaches to reduced income risk and more equality . 
Although unemployment insurance has as its primary task the smoothing of the 
income stream over periods of employment and unemployment, it also has a redistributive 
character. If the risk of unemployment is higher among low-income groups, an unemploy-
Mortensen (1983, p. 72) defines a fully experience-rated unemployment insurance 
system as one in which: " ...the expected tax paid on behalf of a worker while employed is 
equal to the expected benefit drawn when the worker is unemployed.". 
4
 Of course, the efficiency cost of unemployment insurance is not only caused by a 
reduction of labour supply, but may also be due to reduced labour demand (caused by 
employers' unemployment insurance contributions), and, as noted in Section 1, by the 
distortion of decisions to save, invest etc. 
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ment insurance system that redistributes from low-risk persons to those who are 'unem-
ployment-prone' also redistributes income to low-income groups (assuming that premiums 
are not related to the unemployment risk and that unemployment insurance is compulsory, 
see also Disney, 1981, pp. 155-157 and Björklund and Holmlund, 1991, p. 109). We return 
to the trade-off between equality (redistribution) and efficiency in unemployment insurance 
in Section 4. 
In the models by Baily (1978) and Flemming (1978) the efficiency cost of 
unemployment insurance, caused by mond hazard, is set against the insurance gain of 
reduced income risk. The optimal benefit level determines the gap between income when 
employed and unemployed, i.e. the optimal level of coinsurance (see Section 2). At this 
benefit level the marginal costs and gains are balanced. In the two-period model by Baily, 
workers face a probability of lay-off in the second period. The duration of unemployment 
then depends on the benefit, which is paid by a state-organized unemployment insurance 
fund. An important assumption of Baily is that workers, when unemployed, cannot borrow 
against future earnings . The optimal benefit level in a balanced-budget framework 
(unemployment benefits are financed by wage taxes) is then given by equation (6) (see 
Baily, 1978, p. 390): 
This expression states that the optimal unemployment benefit level is set when the relative 
drop in consumption, caused by unemployment (AC is the difference between the 
consumption when employed, Ce, and when unemployed, Cu), times the degree of relative 
risk aversion (R) is equal to the (balanced-budget) elasticity of the duration of unemploy-
ment to unemployment benefits, E}}6. Baily applies the optimality condition (6) to the 
United States and concludes that, at a degree of risk aversion of unity and an elasticity of 
unemployment duration to benefits of 0.15, a replacement ratio of 50 % is about right . 
The actual replacement ratio in the United States at that time was indeed approximately 
Another assumption by Baily is the absence of leisure in the utility function. When 
discussing optimal benefit levels, according to the Baily-model, we should keep in mind 
that, if leisure is positively valued, this would reduce optimal benefit levels. 
6
 The degree of relative risk aversion, evaluated at the level of consumption when 
unemployed, is defined as: [-U"(<^)/U'(C „)].€„, in which U reflects utility. 
Note that, according to equation (6.6) and the values of the elasticity and risk 
aversion, a relative fall in consumption of 0.15 is optimal for the United States. This fall in 
annual consumption by 15 percent corresponds with a 50 percent replacement ratio at an 
average unemployment duration of 18 weeks (see Baily, 1978, p. 391). 
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50 % (see Baily, 1978, p. 393). 
Table 1 shows calculations of optimal replacement ratios for the Netherlands, at 
various levels of risk aversion and of die elasticity of unemployment duration with respect 
to unemployment benefits. The elasticity of microeconomic research is derived from a 
survey of die empirical literature on the relation between die duration of unemployment 
and the benefit level, while the macroeconomic elasticity follows from simulations with a 
macroeconomic model (see Vijlbrief, 1992). It is assumed that the relative drop in 
consumption is equal to one minus the replacement ratio . 
Table 1 : Optimal replacement ratios for the Netherlands according to the Baily-model at 
various levels of risk aversion and the elasticity of unemployment duration to benefits 
Elasticity EjJ Degree of relative risk aversion (R) 
0.5 1.0 2.0 
0.40 (microeconomic research) 20% 60 % 80% 
0.58 (macroeconomic disequi-
librium model) 
0 4 2 % 71 % 
It is difficult to determine die appropriate degree of risk aversion among Dutch workers. 
Baily asserts that unity is a plausible value for the United States9. Assuming that unity is 
also a correct approximation of risk aversion in the Netherlands, the optimal replacement 
ratios based on the elasticities according to micro-economie and macroeconomic research 
are both smaller Üian die actual Dutch replacement ratio in die second half of die eighties 
(Üie weighted average replacement ratio was about 67 percent in 1988, see Vijlbrief, 1992). 
Only if Dutch workers were more risk averse, tiiis actual replacement ratio would be 
'right', according to die Baily-model. 
However, we should be careful in applying this model to Üie NeÜierlands, since it 
could be questioned whedier it gives a correct description of die situation wat unemployed 
individuals face in the Netherlands. Besides, not only the degree of risk aversion, but also 
This assumption is correct when annual income is taken as die determinant of 
consumption and die average duration of unemployment in the Netherlands is about one 
year. This is in rough accordance wiüi calculations for tiie second half of the eighties by 
Van Ours, 1991, p. 375. 
This value of unity is in agreement with the logarithmic utility function, that is widely 
used and has a constant degree of relative risk aversion of unity (see Baily, 1978, pp. 392-
393). 
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the 'true' elasticity of unemployment duration to benefits is a controversial matter (see 
Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991 and Groot and Jehoel-Gijsbers, 1990). Moreover, the 
Baily-model is only conceraed with the risk-reducing motive for unemployment insurance 
and it does not take equality considerations into account10. In this sense, the calculated 
optimal replacement ratios may be regarded as a minimum requirement for an unemploy-
ment insurance system, as it relates to the case where equauty is no separate argument in 
the utility or social welfare function. 
Flemming nas criticized the Baily-model for not giving enough attention to the 
assumptions regarding the capital market. The relevance of these assumptions is easily 
illustrated by the fact that if individuals have infinite time horizons, the capital market is 
perfect (so that one can borrow against future earnings) and the interest rate is zero, the 
optimal replacement ratio will be zero as long as the unemployment insurance system does 
not aim at an explicit redistribution. In an extended version of the Baily-model, Flemming 
derives optimal replacement ratios under 50 percent if capital markets are indeed perfect, 
while, in the absence of these markets, the optimal replacement ratios rise to about 70 
percent11. Hence, as is suggested by Flemming (1978, pp. 422-428), the current levels of 
the replacement ratio in European countries may be (partially) explained by capital market 
imperfections. 
The optimal unemployment insurance models, discussed in this section, indicate 
that several factors are important when discussing the trade-off in social security: the effect 
on work incentives, the degree of risk aversion, the working of capital markets and 
preferences regarding equality. The next section describes a simple framework to analyze 
this trade-off. 
4 THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN EQUTTY AND EFFICIENCY 
4.1 THE FRAMEWORK 
A social security system that optimizes social welfare, would redistribute income until the 
(social) marginal benefit and the marginal cost of redistribution are equal. The marginal 
cost of redistribution is caused by the reduction in labour supply and demand and the 
Disney (1981, pp. 153-154) nas the fundamental objection against the models by 
Baily and Flemming, that they assume homogeneity of the population, which is in 
contradiction with an important rationale (different unemployment probabilities) for state 
intervention in unemployment insurance. 
The introduction of positive utility of leisure leads to a significant reduction in the 
optimal replacement ratio, according to the model by Flemming (1978, pp. 417-422). 
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distortion of other decisions by taxes and social benefits. The marginal benefit of income 
redistribution consists of two parts: fïrstly, the increase in income equality, either directly 
or indirectly (through external effects) raising utility and, secondly, the reduction in income 
uncertamty, caused by more extensive insurance against the loss of income. 
The trade-off between equality and efficiency is brilliantly clarified by Okun (1975, 
pp. 91-95) with bis so-called 'leaky bucket experiment'. Income redistribution is regarded 
as transferring money from the rich to the poor in a leaky bucket: if you tax a rich family 
by $4000, you will have less than $4000 to give to the poor, because of efficiency losses. 
This experiment makes clear that one has to choose where redistribution should be 
stopped: when $3600 remain to be given to the poor (implying an efficiency loss of 10 
percent) or when only $400 remain. This, of course, depends on your taste for equality and 
efficiency. To quote Okun (1975, p. 92): 
"Your answer cannot be right or wrong-any more than your favourite flavour of 
ice cream is right or wrong." 
The trade-off between equality and efficiency in income redistribution has been quantified 
by Van Den Broek (1988) for the Netheriands 12. The author calculates, at various levels 
of the wage elasticity of labour supply, which part of a transfer from the upper 80 percent 
of the income distribution to the bottom 20 percent 'leaks away'.At a weighted average of 
the male and female labour supply elasticity in the Netheriands of 0.29 for the short-run 
and 0.51 for the long-run, Van Den Broek estimates that 60 to 75 percent of the transfer is 
lost. To use the Okun example, of the $4000 tax on the rich, only between $1000 and $1600 
remain to be given to the poor. At the smaller labour supply elasticities, used in Chapters 
4 and 5 of this study, the loss would be about 25 percent. 
We now simplify the above mentioned trade-off between efficiency on the one 
hand "~l equality and income certainty on the other hand. The cost of redistribution is 
narrowed down to the loss in private production while, for the moment, the reduction in 
equality is regarded as the sole benefit of redistribution. In Figure 2, the 'output possibil-
ities curve' shows different combinations of equality and efficiency (measured by real 
output) that are feasible (see Breit, 1974, p. 13). Point H represents the situation of 
maximum output, assuming the absence of income redistribution. To the left and right of 
this point, income is redistributed and output is, consequently, lower than in H, because 
the optimal allocation is distorted. The indifference curves Ij and I2 show the trade-offs for 
The study by Van Den Broek is inspired by a similar study for the United States by 
Browning and Johnson (1984). 
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H \ 
P 
OPC 
Eh Ep equality 
Figure 2 : The choice between equality and output 
an individual between output and equality. The utility function, on which these indifference 
curves are based, embodies some index of equality, along the line of Thurow (1971, see 
also Section 2). Indifference curve I2 is tangent to the output possibilities curve at P: here, 
the marginal rate of substitution between output and equality for the individual is equal to 
the social marginal substitution rate. 
To qualify this situation as a social welfare optimum we have to assume that all 
individuals have preferences, as reflected by I2, or that the political process is capable of 
reaching an unanimous verdict on the optimal income distribution (see Section 2 and 
Thurow, 1971). In a simple majority voting scheme, without unanimity, I2 can be regarded 
as the representation of median preferences and P as the combination of equality and 
output, chosen by the median voter. 
4.2 PREFERENCES, WORK INCENTIVES AND RISK AVERSION 
The model can shed some light on the influence on the optimal level of social security of 
preferences regarding income equality, conjectures about the functioning of the labour 
market and the degree of risk aversion. Starting with the preferences for income equality, 
we distinguish three positions: 
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the 'extreme liberal view',that advocates the faimess of the income distribution 
without any transfers, in other words, the marginal productivity distribution of 
income; this view boils down the maximization of total output in H (see Figure 2); 
we represent this view by an utility function that consists of only one argument, 
real output (see Ut); 
the 'moderate liberal view', that supports redistribution until inequality is reduced 
to an acceptable level, implying a utility function Um; 
the 'egalitarian view',advocating a social security system with infinite substitution 
possibilities between output and equality, see the utility function Ue. 
output 
IL H \ 
N\ lm 
V P 
\ \ ^ l e 
OPC 
Eh E in Ep equality 
Figure 3 : Three points of view on the optimum combination of output and equality 
Equation (7) gives the general form of a linear homogenous Cobb-Douglas utility function 
in output and equality. 
Ug ~Y" .E a+£=l (7) 
The different opinions regarding output and equality can be written as: 
Ul : a-l , /9=0 ; only output maners 
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Um : a+/3=l ; if equality is smaller than Ea in Figure 63 
: o=l , /?0 ; if equality is largerthan En 
Ue : a+/?=l ; infinite substitution between output and equality 
Figure 3 shows indifference curves, reflecting the preference schedules of three individuals 
that have different views on the trade-off between output and equality. Indifference curve 
IL belongs to the utility function U, of the extreme liberal: the market outcome of income 
distribution (Eh) is regarded as optimal and only output shows up in the utility function. 
At point N, the trade-off between output and equality is optimal from the moderate liberal 
point of view. Indifference curve Im shows that this individual is willing to substitute 
equality for output until a certain amount of equality is achieved (En in Figure 3). Here-
after, the moderate liberal no longer attaches any value to more redistribution. Later, we 
show that the theoretical construct of the moderate liberal may, in practice, be identified 
as an advocate of a so-called mini-system of social security. Finally, point P shows the 
optimum combination of output and equality (E ) for an egalitarian. 
The slope of an indifference curve for an egalitarian, for example Ie, can be 
written as: 
au 
1L--JL--L i (6.8) 
dE 8U_ E ' a 
dY 
At the optimum P, the output possibilities curve is tangent to the indifference curve Ie, 
ft.-*-* 
which implies that in the optimum, the elasticity of output with respect to equality 
equates -0/ cc 
— 
— - -Ê (6.10) 
dE a 
~Ë~ 
Figure 4 shows the effect on the optimum combination of output and equality of a shift in 
preferences. When er rises and 0 falls (reflecting a shift in preferences from equality to 
output), the slope of the indifference curve at P is reduced (see equation (8)). The new 
optimum is achieved in Q, with less equality and more output. 
The model can also be used to illustrate the effects on the optimum combination 
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Figure 4 : A shift in preferences from equality to output 
of equality and output of different opinions regarding the functioning of the labour market. 
The effects on output of a rise in the replacement ratio (reflecting a reduction in the 
incentives for labour supply and demand, and an increase in equality) are much smaller in 
disequilibrium models of the Dutch labour market than in equilibrium models (see Den 
Butter and Compaijen, 1991 and Vijlbrief, 1992). Suppose that the output possibilities 
curve of the Figures 2-4 reflects combinations of output and equality in the case of a 
labour market in disequilibrium, which is demand constrained since the wage rate is too 
high to clear the market. Figure 5 shows this disequilibrium output possibilities curve 
(OPCde_), but also an output possibilities curve of an economy with a clearing labour 
market (OPC „ ) . This latter curve illustrates that at each level of equality, the equilibrium 
labour market gives a higher output. Furthermore, when equality lies above the market 
outcome (E > Eh), a rise in equality causes a larger reduction in output according to the 
equilibrium curve, compared to the disequilibrium curve. This is in agreement with the 
results of the above mentioned studies, that show that the effects on production and 
employment of a change in the replacement ratio (as a crude measure for equality) are 
larger in the equilibrium model than in the disequilibrium model. 
Figure 5 shows the effect on the optimum level of redistribution of different 
opinions about the functioning of the labour market. Of the two persons, whose prefer-
ences regarding equality and output are equal, individual 1 thinks the labour market is best 
15 
H 
12
 \ 
output / " " " ï\ R 
11 
NT\ / / ^ ~ 
'
y 
\ \ OPCeq 
OPCdeq 
Eh Er Eq equality 
Figure 5 : A shift in the output possibilities curve from a non-dearing to a dearing 
labour market 
described by a disequilibrium model and he maximizes bis utility at point Q, with a level of 
equality E q . Individual 2 believes that the labour market is cleared by flexible wages and 
bis optimum is point R, with less equality (Er) and more output13. 
Until now, we focused on the trade-off between efficiency and equality. Of course, 
the risk-reducing effect of social security must also be taken into account. It is assumed 
that the measure of equality (E) also reflects the amount of risk reduction. Hence, when E 
increases, not only does equality rise, but risk is reduced at the same time (E is a measure 
of equity now). Note that in this simple model, a decrease in risk causes efficiency losses, 
as measured by real output, because incentives to supply and demand labour are reduced. 
Of course, more social security can actually increase total efficiency, when private 
insurance is not available because of problems like moral hazard and adverse selection 
(see Section 2). 
Turning to the three positions on efficiency and income equality, that were distin-
guished eariier in this section, we speculate on how these views may be influenced by 
introducing risk. The 'extreme liberal' may regard social security as totally superfluous, 
In Figure 6.5,moving from a disequilibrium to a clearing labour market bas a larger 
'substitution effect' (equality becomes more expensive in terms of output) than 'income 
effect' (more output and equality are possible). 
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since private insurance markets should be able to cover income losses, due to, for example, 
unemployment. The 'moderate liberal' (identified earlier as an advocate of a mini-system 
of social secunty) may take a more subtle position: social secunty is only necessaiy in 
those cases where private insurance markets show failures. Thus, one can advance a mini-
system out of equality considerations (social secunty as a last resort for those who are not 
able to provide for themselves) or out of insurance considerations (social security as 
insurance when private insurance markets show failures). The 'egalitarian', finally, may 
insist that social security should, at least take care of risks, not covered by private 
insurance, but that the system should also be used for redistribution purposes. 
In our simple model, a rise in risk aversion can be reflected by a shift in prefer-
ences towards E: people want to trade in output for insurance. In the utility function, a 
falls and /? rises14. The effects of an increase in risk aversion are not illustrated by a 
figure, since they are, of course, the reverse of the shift in preferences that was shown in 
Figure 4. Finally, the influence of an increase in capital market imperfections is not further 
elaborated here, since it will be clear that this gives rise to a higher optimal value of E. 
Summarizing this (sub)section, the trade-off model of social security can, firstly, be 
used to identify three different opinions on the optimal combination of efficiency, 
measured by output, and equity, consisting of equality and insurance. Secondly, in this 
framework we can study the effects of a change in preferences, of different opinions about 
the working of the labour market and of changes in the degree of risk aversion. In Section 
4.3,the model is applied to the unemployment insurance system in the Netherlands. 
4.3 EQUITY AND EFFICIENCYIN DUTCH UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
In this section, the framework of a trade-off in social security between efficiency on the 
one hand, and equality and risk reduction on the other, is applied to unemployment 
insurance in the Netherlands. As in Section 4.2, we measure efficiency by real output, 
while the replacement ratio is used as a proxy for the amount of equality and risk 
reduction (equity) . We assume that at the point of no income redistribution and 
maximum output (see point H in Figure 2), the replacement ratio is zero. Figure 6 shows 
In the utility function (6.7), the measure of relative risk aversion, [-U"(Y)/U'(Y)].Y, 
is equal to fi. Hence, a rise in risk aversion indeed implies a rise in fi. 
Note that in reality the amount of equality and risk reduction and the effect on 
output are not only determined by the replacement ratio, but, for example, also by the 
financing system of unemployment insurance and the time path of benefits (see Björklund 
and Holmlund, 1991,pp. 164-172and Vijlbrief, 1992) 
17 
output 
OPCeq 
replacement 
ratio 
Figure 6 : The output possibilities curve's in the case of a non-clearing labour market 
(OPCdeq) and an equilibrium labour market (OPCeq) 
the theoretically expected relation between the replacement ratio and real output, the 
output possibilities curve, for a non-clearing labour market (OPCd ) and an equilibrium 
labour market (OPC^). 
As a first step, the macroeconomic models of Vijlbrief (1992) are used to 
determine empirical output possibilities curves for the Netherlands. Secondly, the situation 
with regard to Dutch unemployment insurance in the eighties is evaluated: what are the 
efficiency costs of the achieved levels of equality and risk reduction? We then make some 
speculative, revealed preference, calculations of the parameters of the utüity function for 
the median voter or the social welfare function. Fourthly, some attention is given to the 
question whether changes in one's opinion regarding the functioning of the Dutch labour 
market or changes in preferences and risk aversion may be responsible for the widely 
supported view that Dutch social security (of which unemployment insurance is a part) has 
become too large in the eighties. Finally, an altemative to the current system of unemploy-
ment insurance, a so-called mini-system, is shortly investigated with regard to its efficiency-
increasing abilities. 
Figure 7 shows the output possibilities curves for the disequilibrium and the 
equilibrium model of Vijlbrief (1992). The essential difference between the two models is 
the assumption of market-clearing with regard to the Dutch labour market. In the 
disequilibrium model, the wage rate is rigid and lies above market-clearing level, while the 
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Figure 7 : Output possibilities curve's for the Netherlands, according to the disequili-
brium and the equilibrium model 
labour market is instantaneously cleared by flexible wages in the equilibrium model. The 
output possibilities curves are obtained by taking the set of exogenous variables for a base 
year (in tbis case 1982), and varying the level of the replacement ratio16. Hence, Üiese 
trade-offs give an indication of the efficiency costs, measured in real output, of a certain 
level of equity, measured by the replacement ratio. Note that on both curves the elasticity 
of output with respect to the replacement ratio rises with the level of the replacement 
ratio. This is caused by the specification of the labour supply function, in which the 
elasticity of labour supply to the replacement ratio also rises with the latter. Figure 7 
shows that output is not very sensitive to changes in the replacement ratio, according to 
the disequilibrium model. Tbis is caused by the low elasticity of labour supply with regard 
to the replacement ratio and by the assumption of employment (and output) being 
determined by labour demand in this model. The replacement ratio affects employment 
and output only indirectly, by infiuencing the excess-supply of labour and, consequently, the 
wage rate (see Vijlbrief, 1992). Hence, one's opinion on the functioning of the Dutch 
The replacement ratio is defined as the weighted average of the replacement ratio 
for people on unemployment insurance, the replacement ratio for people on unemploy-
ment assistance and the zero replacement ratio for people who do not get any benefit at 
all. Note that this weighted average replacement ratio not only takes the (relative) benefit 
level into account, but also, indirectly, the duration of the benefit entitlement. 
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labour market, non-clearing versus clearing, is of the utmost importance for the efficiency 
losses, caused by the unemployment insurance system. For example, according to the 
output possibilities curve for the equilibrium model, the 1982-replacement ratio of 65.6 
percent causes real output to be 13.5 percent smaller than it would be in the absence of 
unemployment insurance. For the disequilibrium model, this output loss would only be 1.4 
percent. Figure 7 also shows the effects on real output of the development of the replace-
ment ratio in the Netherlands between 1975 and 1988. 
Table 2 : The elasticity of output to the replacement ratio (eg) and calculations of the 
parameters of the utility function (a and # 
disequilibrium model equilibrium model 
replacement ratio at 1988-
level: 66.9 % 
e£ = -0.08 e j = -0.45 
a = 0.93, £ = 0.07 a = 0.69, £ = 0.31 
replacement ratio at 1981-
ïevel: 63.8 % 
e | = -0.03 e£ = -0.33 
Q = 0.97,0 = 0.03 a = 0.75, £ = 0.25 
We now turn to some revealed preference calculations of the parameters of the 
median voter utility (or social welfare) function. The Dutch median voter is supposed to be 
an 'egalitarian', having a linear homogeneous Cobb-Douglas utility function in output and 
the replacement ratio (the latter reflecting the levels of equality and risk reduction). We 
also assume that the actual combination of output and the replacement ratio reflects the 
median voter's preferences regarding equity and efficiency. Our models provide informa-
tion on the elasticity of output to the replacement ratio and, hence, given a certain 
replacement ratio, the parameters of the utility function can be calculated, using equation 
(10). Table 2 shows these calculations at two levels of the replacement ratio for the 
disequilibrium and equilibrium model. 
Given a certain replacement ratio, the median voter who thinks the Dutch labour 
market is instantaneously cleared by flexible wages, must have a larger preference for 
equity or be more risk averse (a larger £) than the median voter who thinks the Dutch 
labour market is better described by a disequilibrium model. The 'equilibrium thinker' 
considers the efficiency loss, due to a certain level of the replacement ratio, to be larger 
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and, hence, he has to like equity more than the 'disequilibrium thinker'. 
According to our trade-off model of equity and efficiency, there may be various 
explanations for the fact that Dutch benefit levels are increasingly regarded as too 
generous and Dutch social security as 'too large'. First, preferences may shift from equality 
to efficiency or risk aversion may fall (a rise in a and a fall in 0), which will lead to a 
lower optimum replacement ratio. A second reason may be that the equilibrium model has 
become more popular in the Netherlands. If a disequilibrium thinker is turned into an 
equilibrium thinker, the optimum replacement ratio will fall, given the preferences for 
efficiency and equity, refiected by pi a. In the equilibrium model, the elasticity of output to 
the replacement ratio is larger; to reach an optimum again, the replacement ratio must 
1 ft 
fall . One (or more) of the above mentioned changes could be responsible for the 
change-over in opinions about social security in the Netherlands in the eighties. However, 
it could well be that there are other reasons, such as the high burden of taxes and 
premiums or the low level of (active) labour force participation for the view that Dutch 
social security has become too large. 
This section closes with a brief look at the equity and efficiency effects of 
replacing the current Dutch unemployment insurance system by a so-called mini-system. In 
such a system, unemployment benefits above the minimum level are abolished and 
individuals are free to (privately) insure themselves against this risk. Proponents of a mini-
system argue that this may solve the problems in Dutch social security (efficiency losses, a 
high burden of taxes and premiums and a low level of labour force participation), and, 
moreover, involves less paternalism and more individual freedom (see for example De 
Kam and Van Herwaarden, 1991, and Groenveld, 1991). Earlier, in section 4.1, we 
labelled proponents of such a system 'moderate liberals': social security should only 
provide for minimum standards of living1 . Suppose, the Dutch govemment introdu-
If we interpret the utility function as a social welfare function, the line of reasoning 
stays the same: the efficiency costs of a certain replacement ratio are higher in a society 
with a clearing labour market and, consequently, it has to have a larger preference for 
equity, than a society in which the labour market has rigid wages above the market-
clearing level. 
Take, for example, as a starting position a disequilibrium thinker at the 1988-levelof 
the replacement ratio of 66.9 percent and with a fi/ a of 0.08. If he changes into an 
equilibrium thinker, his new optimum will be at the point, where the elasticity, but now in 
the equilibrium model, is -0.08. This point will be at a considerably lower level of the 
replacement ratio. 
Remember that a mini-system can also be defended by pointing out that social 
security should only correct the private insurance market failures and should not aim at 
further redistribution. 
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ces a mini-system of unemployment insurance, with a benefit level equal to the current 
unemployment assistance benefit level. The replacement ratio, according to this system 
(based on the 1988 unemployment assistance replacement ratio), is 63.9 percent. Figure 8 
shows the effects of the mini-system, compared to the actual replacement ratio in 1988, by 
a shift along the output possibilities curves. According to the disequilibrium model, the 
gain in real output by the mini-system would be 0.8 percent, and, according to the 
equilibrium model, 2.3 percent. These effects are both balanced-budget, keeping the 
government's budget deficit fixed. A sensitivity analysis shows that the effects of the mini-
system are dependent on the elasticity of labour supply with regard to the replacement 
ratio: the higher this elasticity, the larger the positive effects of the mini-system on output 
and employment. 
real output 
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Figure 8 : The effects on output of the introduction of two mini-systems of unemployment 
insurance 
5 SUMMARY 
This paper is concerned with equity and efficiency in social security. If social security, or 
more specifically unemployment insurance, leads to losses in employment and output, then 
why is it such a widely observed phenomenon? The first rationale for social security is 
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utility interdependence or a preference for equality, combined with the public good 
character of income redistribution. Secondly, the combination of risk, aversion to risk and 
private insurance market failures is an important raison d'être for social security. Wiüi 
regard to unemployment insurance, the problems of undiversifiable uncertainties, adverse 
selection and moral hazard may be powerful in explaining the amount of state intervention. 
As was said earlier, social security may even be efficiency-increasing when it takes care of 
privately uninsurable risks. However, social security remains a second-best solution, since, 
in practice, taxes that do not distort economie decisions and unemployment benefits 
without moral hazard are impossible. Additional reasons for the existence of social security 
are the administrative efficiency of the system and paternalism. 
The second-best character of unemployment insurance raises the question of the 
optimal balance between efficiency and equity (equality and risk reduction). Some models 
of optimal unemployment insurance, discussed in Section 3, leave out the equality aspect 
and indicate the elasticity of unemployment with respect to the replacement ratio, the 
degree of risk aversion, and capital market imperfections as the determinants of the 
optimum benefit level. An application to the Netherlands of one of these models, the 
Baily-model, suggests that Dutch unemployment benefit levels are 'too high'. However, as 
stressed in Section 4, one's taste for equality plays a major part in determining the 
optimum level of income redistribution. Otherwise stated, it will be diffïcult and probably 
impossible, to establish what the Dutch unemployment benefit level should be. 
What we can determine, is a relation between the feasible levels of equity and 
efficiency, the output possibilities curve. Three typical views on equity (capturing equality 
and income protection) are confronted with this output possibilities curve: firstly, the 
extreme liberal view, that regards the market outcome as a fair income distribution and 
that assumes private insurance markets to function perfectly; secondly, the moderate 
liberal view, that advances a mini-system of social security and, thirdly, the egalitarian view 
that promotes income redistribution beyond minimum standards of living. For an egalitar-
ian, bis preferences with regard to equality and efficiency, nis degree of risk aversion and 
bis judgment of the functioning of the labour market are crucial in determining the 
optimum benefit level. 
With regard to unemployment insurance in the Netherlands, we constructed two 
output possibilities curves: one, assuming the Dutch labour market is characterized by 
excess-supply and one, assuming the Dutch labour market is instantaneously cleared by 
flexible wages. The trade-off between equity and efficiency in Dutch unemployment 
insurance is simplified to a relation between the replacement ratio and output. Hence, 
some other aspects of the unemployment insurance system that affect efficiency, such as 
the financing method and the time profile of benefits, are not considered. As could be 
23 
expected, the models differ significantly in their evaluation of the efficiency cost of Dutch 
unemployment insurance: for example, according to the equilibrium model, the 1982-
replacement ratio of 65.6 percent causes output to be 13.5 percent smaller man it wouldbe 
in a situation without unemployment insurance, while the output loss is only 1.4 percent, 
according to the disequilibrium model. There are theoretical and empirical indications (see 
Springer, 1991, pp. 59-73, Graafland, 1990, p. 24, and Vijlbrief, 1992) that me Dutch labour 
market is best described by the latter model, which would make the effects, according to 
the disequilibrium model, the most realistic. 
This paper then returns to the question of the optimal unemployment insurance 
benefit level. The view, which was increasingly supported in the eighties, that the unem-
ployment benefit level is too high in the Netherlands can be related to the, above men-
tioned, determinants of the optimum benefit level: preferences may have shifted towards 
efficiency, risk aversion may have declined and more people may believe now, that the 
Dutch labour market is cleared by flexible wages. However, there may be other reasons 
(for example the high burden of taxes and premiums) that have induced the view that the 
Dutch social security system is too generous. Finally, we calculate the output gain of a 
mini-system of unemployment insurance. Again, the results heavily depend on the 
assumption of a clearing versus a non-clearing labour market in the Netherlands. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper is concerned with equity and efficiency in social security. If social security, or 
more specifically unemployment insurance, leads to losses in employment and output, men 
why is it such a widely observed phenomenon? The first rationale for social security is 
utility interdependence or a preference for equality, combined with the public good 
character of income redistribution. Secondly, the combination of risk, aversion to risk and 
private insurance market failures is an important raison d'être for social security. Addi-
tional reasons for the existence of social security are the administrative efficiency of the 
system and patemalism. However, social security remains a second-best solution, since in 
practice taxes that do not distort economie decisions and benefits without mond hazard are 
impossible. The second-best character of unemployment insurance raises the question of 
the optimal balance between efficiency and equity (equality and risk reduction). Some 
models of optimal unemployment insurance leave out the equality aspect and indicate the 
elasticity of unemployment with respect to the replacement ratio, the degree of risk 
aversion, and capital market imperfections as the determinants of the optimum benefit 
level. However, one's taste for equality plays a major part in determining the optimum 
level of income redistribution. The paper determines a relation between the feasible levels 
of equity and efficiency, the output possibilities curve. Three typical views on equity 
(capturing equality and income protection) are confronted with this output possibilities 
curve: the extreme liberal view, the moderate liberal and the egalitarian view. With regard 
to unemployment insurance in the Netherlands, we constructed two output possibilities 
curve's: one, assuming the Dutch labour market is characterized by excess-supply and one, 
assuming the Dutch labour market is instantaneously cleared by flexible wages. The 
models differ significantly in their evaluation of the efficiency cost of Dutch unemployment 
insurance: for example, according to the equilibrium model, the 1982-replacement ratio of 
65.6 percent causes output to be 13.5 percent smaller than it would be in a situation 
without unemployment insurance, while the output loss is only 1.4 percent, according to 
the disequilibrium model. Finally, we calculate the output gains of a mini-system of 
unemployment insurance. Again, the results heavily depend on the assumption of a 
clearing versus a non-clearing labour market in the Netherlands. 
Keywords: Social security, unemployment insurance, labour market, optimum benefits 
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